Signaling in Auctions and Mechanisms: Theory and Experimental Evidence” (SIGNAL, ANR-19-CE26-0009) is a research project funded by the French National Agency for Research (ANR) started in February 2020 for 70 months, and hosted at the Panthéon-Assas University (Lemma). The principal investigator is Olivier Bos.

Project Summary

In many applied mechanisms, notably auctions, participants do not only care about winning and their payment but also about the information that their bidding performance discloses to others. The inferences of the outsiders about the qualities of a bidder depend on the available information and the format of the auction, and then affect the bidding behavior. We would like, thanks to theoretical and experimental analysis, to provide new perspectives for economic regulation (public procurements) and allocation mechanisms, such as auctions but not only, used in organizations (charitable organizations, art auction houses). Especially, we would like to understand how the signaling device affects the bidding behavior and then the revenue and efficiency properties in the optimal (revenue-maximization) mechanisms.


Published Papers

Working papers