Working Papers

Optimal Auctions with Signaling Bidders, with Martin Pollrich.

Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling, with Tom Truyts, R&R at International Journal of Game Theory.

Signaling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence, with Francisco Gomez-Martinez, Sander Onderstal and Tom Truyts, R&R at Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Existence of Equilibrium in All-Pay Auctions with Price Externalities.


Auctions with Signaling Concerns, with Tom Truyts, accepted at Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.

Charitable Asymmetric Bidders, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 22(2), pp. 320-337.

Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets, with Martin Ranger, Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, vol. 129, pp 127-144.

Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction, with Béatrice Roussillon and Paul Schweinzer, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2016, vol. 118(4), pp. 785-815.
Online supplementary material is available here.

Charity Auctions for the Happy Few, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, vol 79(C), pp. 83-92.

All-Pay Auction with Polynomial Rewards, with Martin Ranger, Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2014, vol. 115-116, pp. 361-377.

Wars of Attrition and All-Pay Auctions with Stochastic Competition, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2012, vol. 48(2), pp. 83-91.

How Lotteries Outperform Auctions, Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110(3), pp. 262-264. A longer version is available here.

Publications in French

Effets de réputation dans les enchères : l'inégalité des perdants, with Tom Truyts, accepted at Revue Economique.

L'enchère à offres payantes. Un mécanisme aux applications diverses, Revue Economique, 2011, vol. 62, pp. 5-28.