Associate Professor in Economics
(Maître de conférences HDR)
Panthéon-Assas University
Junior Member
Institut Universitaire de France
Research Associate
ZEW, Mannheim
Research Fellow
CESifo, Munich
A working paper (updated October 2020), Optimal Auctions with Signaling Bidders, with Martin Pollrich.
Auctions with Signaling Concerns, with Tom Truyts, is forthcoming at Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
The program of Virtual Market Design Seminar Series for this fall is now available. The Virtual MD Seminar is a bi-weekly online and inter-institutional seminar, which takes place on Monday at 4:00-5:00pm CET (Paris time).
The 2nd KIT-Paris2-ZEW Workshop on Market Design is postponed to June 7-8, 2021.
ANR Grant (French National Agency for Research) Signaling in Auctions and Mechanisms: Theory and Experimental Evidence, from February 2020, 48 months.