Associate Professor in Economics
(Maître de conférences HDR)
Panthéon-Assas University
Junior Member
Institut Universitaire de France
Research Associate
ZEW, Mannheim
Research Fellow
CESifo, Munich
A working paper (updated October 2020), Optimal Auctions with Signaling Bidders, with Martin Pollrich.
Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence, with Francisco Gomez-Martinez, Sander Onderstal and Tom Truyts, is forthcoming at Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Auctions with Signaling Concerns, with Tom Truyts, is forthcoming at Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
The program of Virtual Market Design Seminar Series for winter and spring 2021 is now available. The Virtual MD Seminar is a bi-weekly online and inter-institutional seminar, which takes place on Monday at 4:00-5:00pm CET (Paris time).
ANR Grant (French National Agency for Research) Signaling in Auctions and Mechanisms: Theory and Experimental Evidence, from February 2020, 54 months.